An Ontology for Insider Threat Indicators Development and Applications
Daniel L. Costa, Matthew Lloyd Collins, Samuel J. Perl, Michael J Albrethsen, George J Silowash, Derrick Spooner · 2014
Abstract—We describe our ongoing development of an insider threat indicator ontology. Our ontology is intended to serve as a standardized expression method for potential indicators of malicious insider activity, as well as a formalization of much of our team’s research on insider threat detection, prevention, and mitigation. This ontology bridges the gap between natural language descriptions of malicious insiders, malicious insider activity, and machine-generated data that analysts and investigators use to detect behavioral and technical observables of insider activity. The ontology provides a mechanism for sharing and testing indicators of insider threat across multiple participants without compromising organization-sensitive data, thereby enhancing the data fusion and information sharing capabilities of the insider threat detection domain. Keywords—ontology; insider threat; data fusion; information sharing I. BACKGROUND The study of insider threat presents some of the most complex challenges in information security. Even defining the insider threat has proven difficult, with interpretations and scope varying depending on the problem space. The CERT