Human Reasoning is Both Logical and Pragmatic
Ira Andrew Noveck, R. Brooke Lea, George M. Davidson, David P. O'Brien · Intellectica Revue de l Association pour la Recherche Cognitive · 1991
Although several prominent critics have argued against any significant role for a logical or mathematical competence in human reasoning, we argue that such a competence is basic. Our approach to logical reasoning consists of (a) a basic set of inference schémas for logical particles such as if, and, not, and or that accounts for competence, (b) a reasoning program that implements them, and (c) a set of independently motivated pragmatic principles. We describe evidence that supports our approach, and then discuss several prominent arguments that have been made against competence models. We conclude that the critics have not established their case ; rather, reasoning errors seem to result from strategic and pragmatic demands that are beyond the scope of a basic competence. Finally, we discuss text comprehension as a case study of how logical and pragmatic processes work together in a single line of reasoning to provide a coherent and integrated representation. pragmatic processes work together in a single line of reasoning to provide a coherent and integrated representation.