Wireless link connectivity under hostile interference: Nash and stackelberg equilibria
Gam D. Nguyen, Sastry Kompella, Clement Kam, Jeffrey E. Wieselthier, Anthony Ephremides · 2016
We formulate the interaction between communication and hostile interference in wireless systems as a non-zero-sum two-player game. One player is the transmitter aiming to establish or maintain the communication to its receivers, and the other player is the interferer aiming to prevent or disrupt the communication. The strategy of the transmitter is a transmission power level, while the strategy of the interferer is an interfering power level. We provide closed-form equilibria for both Nash and Stackelberg models. We show that, while a Stackelberg equilibrium always exists, a Nash equilibrium exists only when the wireless channel is affected by fading. In addition, for the case of Rayleigh channel fading, we show that both players have the same power cost at Nash equilibrium.