Improved Side Channel Cube Attacks on PRESENT.
Xinjie Zhao, Tao Wang, Shize Guo · 2011
Abstract: The paper presents several improved side channel cube attacks on PRESENT based on single bit leakage model. Compared with the previous study of Yang et al in CANS 2009 [30], based on the same model of single bit leakage in the 3 rd round, we show that: if the PRESENT cipher structure is unknown, for the leakage bit 0, 32-bit key can be recovered within 2 7.17 chosen plaintexts; if the cipher structure is known, for the leakage bit 4,8,12, 48-bit key can be extracted by 2 11.92 chosen plaintexts, which is less than 2 15 in [30]; then, we extend the single bit leakage model to the 4 th round, based on the two level “divide and conquer ” analysis strategy, we propose a sliding window side channel cube attack on PRESENT, for the leakage bit 0, about 2 15.14 chosen plaintexts can obtain 60-bit key; in order to obtain more key bits, we propose an iterated side channel cube attack on PRESENT, about 2 8.15 chosen plaintexts can obtain extra 12 equivalent key bits, so overall 2 15.154 chosen plaintexts can reduce the PRESENT-80 key searching space to 2 8; finally, we extend the attack to PRESENT-128, about 2 15.156 chosen plaintexts can extract 85 bits key, and reduce the PRESENT-128 key searching space to 2 43. Compared with the previous study of Abdul-Latip et al in ASIACCS 2011 [31] based on the Hamming weight leakage model, which can extract 64-bit key of PRESENT-80/128 by 2 13 chosen plaintexts, our attacks can extract more key bits, and have certain advantages over [31].