Scientific Diagrams as Traces of Group-Dependent Cognition: A Brief Cognitive-Historical Analysis
Benjamin Sheredos · eScholarship (California Digital Library) · 2013
Scientific Diagrams as Traces of Group-Dependent Cognition: A Brief Cognitive-Historical Analysis Ben Sheredos ([email protected]) Department of Philosophy and Center for Chronobiology, UC San Diego, 9500 Gilman Dr., La Jolla, CA 92103 USA Abstract between social-professional groups. To do this I develop a new strategy of inquiry: analyzing published scientific diagrams which document the history of research. My case study concerns research into the mechanisms of circadian rhythmicity in cyanobacteria (blue-green algae). One goal of the paper is to show how such a “literature review” can serve to investigate scientists’ group-dependent cognition. Recent research has begun to explore the role of diagrams as cognitive tools. Here I develop new conceptual and methodological tools for exploring the sociality of cognition involving diagrams. First, I distinguish two varieties of group- dependent cognition. Second, extending Nersessian’s method of cognitive-historical analysis, I show how a suitably- informed “literature review” of diagrams published in scientific articles offers a window into the group-dependent cognition of scientists. I end by sketching future avenues of inquiry, and how this approach may inform science education. Extending the Cognitive-Historical Method Keywords: chronobiology; cognitive-historical analysis; group cognition; member cognition; scientific diagrams. Introduction Diagrams as Cognitive and Social Tools Cognitive scientists have recently adopted a variety of approaches to studying graphical practices (“GPs”). Tversky applies her work on embodiment, spatial cognition and navigation to study spatial graphics and spatial design more generally (2011a; 2011b; Tversky, Heiser, Lee, & Daniel 2009). Hegarty focuses on the cognitive abilities underlying the “spatial intelligence” which facilitates learning from diagrams by students in the sciences (2004; 2010; 2011). Cheng explores how suitably constrained, innovative GPs support learning the conceptual structure of highly mathematized domains (Cheng 1997; 2002; 2009; 2011). The focus of such research has tended to be on the consumption of completed diagrams as a cognitive activity of individuals. 1 A few studies have also addressed the production of diagrams by individuals. However, constructing and reasoning with GPs are also social practices. Some researchers have recently developed ethnographic methods to study group cognition involving completed diagrams (Alac, 2008; 2011; Kirsh, 2009). Here I take a different approach. First, I highlight social aspects of cognition in diagram production. GPs often integrate ideas from a variety of earlier sources, and diagrams indicate the designer’s understanding of her field: GPs inform us about how individuals perceive the social and professional groups of which they are members. Second, I stress the social effects of diagram consumption: creating and disseminating diagrams is a manipulation of the social environment which helps to define boundaries This is especially true of the experimental literature in which isolated subjects complete tasks involving diagrams. The present paper extends the method of cognitive-historical analysis (Nersessian, 1992; 1995; 2002; 2008). The method is historical in that it takes as data the existing record of investigative practices in the science(s) of interest. In early work, Nersessian focused on the work of notable individuals (e.g., Maxwell), highlighting specific developments in their thinking. Here, I examine a years-long record of published figures depicting multiple authors’ conceptions, at various stages of inquiry, of the known and hypothesized mechanisms of circadian rhythmicity in cyanobacteria. The cognitive aspect of the methodology is rooted in a continuum hypothesis – that “the cognitive practices scientists have invented and developed over the course of the history of science are […] sophisticated outgrowths of the kinds of cognitive strategies humans employ in coping with their environments and in problem solving of a more ordinary kind” (Nersessian, 2008). Scientists, like other humans, form cooperative groups to tackle large-scale tasks, and freely draw inspiration from peers when it is available. 2 I shall show that with careful attention to the field-wide context in which diagrams are developed, we can clearly identify aspects of GPs which indicate group-dependent cognition among scientists. In this initial demonstration, I focus on diagrams from review-style articles, penned by (sometimes several) well-known and respected authors in the field. The express purpose of such publications is to offer a window into the social, conceptual, and evidential context constituting the current state of play in the field. Nersessian has always stressed that a full understanding of cognitive activities must embed them within their social context. Recently, she and her colleagues have directly studied the interplay between social and cognitive factors in scientific practice (Osbeck, Nersessian, Malone, & Newstetter, 2011). Drawing upon their insights, I hold that the lines between “individual” and “group” cognition are Scientific research is not fully communal and cooperative; great incentives promote individual achievement as well.