Power analysis attacks against FPGA implementation of KLEIN
Shaohua Tang, Weijian Li, Jianhao Wu, Zheng Hu Gong, Ming Tang · Security and Communication Networks · 2016
Abstract KLEIN is a family of block ciphers whose lightweight features are suitable for resource‐constrained devices. However, the original design of KLEIN does not consider the potential attacks by power analysis methods. This paper presents power analysis attacks against an field‐programmable gate array (FPGA) implementation of KLEIN by the authors of KLEIN. The attacking strategy, attacking point, and complexity of our attacks via power analysis against KLEIN are discussed in detail. Besides, the implementation of the attacks is also described, and the experimental data is given. A lot of attacking experiments are launched by this paper; the best method in our experiment is Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attack that requires only 4000 random plaintexts and 115 s to reveal the 64‐bit key of KLEIN, with the storage complexity nearly 212 and the success probability of attack nearly 100%. Finally, a defensive countermeasure against our attacks is proposed. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.