Inference to the More Robust Explanation
Nicholaos John Jones · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · 2016
There is a new argument form within theoretical biology. This form takes as input competing explanatory models; it yields as output the conclusion that one of these models is more plausible than the others. The driving force for this argument form is an analysis showing that one model exhibits more parametric robustness than its competitors. This article examines these inferences to the more robust explanation, analysing them as variants of inference to the best explanation. The article defines parametric robustness and distinguishes it from more familiar kinds of robustness. The article also argues that parametric robustness is an explanatory virtue not subsumed by more familiar explanatory virtues, and that the plausibility verdicts in the conclusions of inferences to the more robust explanations are best interpreted as guidance for research activity, rather than claims about likely truth. 1. Introducing Inference to the More Robust Explanation2. Inference to the More Robust Explanation in the Study of Apoptosis 2.1. Regulating apoptosis2.2. Competing models and evidential indecision2.3. Measuring robustness2.4. Robustness as a guide to plausibility2.5. Varieties of robustness3. Inference to the More Robust Explanation as Inference to the Best Explanation 3.1. The structure of inference to the best explanation3.2. Parametric robustness as an explanatory virtue rather than an explanandum3.3. Relation of parametric robustness to other explanatory virtues4. Epistemological Significance of Inference to the More Robust Explanation 4.1. Plausibility in practice4.2. Plausibility in principle5. Conclusion