The study of securities research report reliability's supervision——the analysis of the tripartite game of analysts,interest groups and regulators
Jiaju Wang · Journal of Anhui University · 2014
Research-report-scandalhas sparked the stock market's concerns about reliability of the research report.Previous studies were based on binary,static model,however,this paper argued that there was tripartite dynamic game of analysts,interest groups and regulators.We have constructed the tripartite game model;deduced by mathematical formulas,and then got Nash equilibrium of the model.Moreover,results showed that:research report's reliability was inversely proportional to the irregularities cooperative strategies probability of analysts and interest groups;the optimal probability of the irregularities cooperative behavior is proportional to the cost of regulators' inspection strategies,and was inversely proportional to the cost of the irregularities cooperative strategies;the optimal probability of regulators' inspection strategies was inversely proportional to both the probability and the cost's coefficients of verifying irregularities cooperative strategies,and was unrelated to the incomes from the irregularities cooperative strategies.