Game analysis based on trust for time slot assignment in wireless sensor networks
Yong Zhang · Jisuanji gongcheng yu sheji · 2011
To help wireless sensor network make a decision for gaining profit and constraining malicious nodes,a game model of time slot assignment with trust incentives is presented.Firstly,the nonzero-sum game between the cluster head and the malicious node is re-cognized and decomposed according to the utility matrix.It is pointed out that the prime reason in the constraint of the malicious node is that the Nash equilibrium as the punishment used for preventing the malicious node from deviation of the strategy with more gains,and the game model is constructed.Then,the necessary and sufficient conditions for a Nash reversion strategy to be a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is proved.The single round Nash equillibrum exerts the punishment to the deviant of corporate strategy so as to engender coo-perative effect in indefinitely repeated game between the cluster head and the malicious node.Finally,by J-Sim,the decision maken by the proposed game model could increase the network gains and constrain the destructive behavior of the malicious node.