China National Audit Reporting System Research——Based on Signaling Game
Zirong Ye · Technoeconomics & Management Research · 2012
In the context of the promoting the construction of China`s democracy government by law,announcing the audit results have been an inevitable choice for the government.Audit results reporting system,as an disclosure system,one can lift public accountability of the government and the audit institutions,and the other can provide an effective means for the public to monitor the government.Viewing from the current situation of the national audit reporting system,reporting the audit results is abnormal,which is contrary to the process of democratic government by law.It can not be played the information link function between the national audit and the public,and not to promote the further development of social democracy.By structuring the signaling game model between the government and the public and solving the equilibrium path,we revealed the key conditions for the full implementation of the national audit reporting system,and also put forward the policy recommendations from the establishment of audit quality evaluation system,forming an effective mechanism for supervising and training of audit staff,improving the public's oversight capacity and increasing processing punishment,to ensure effective operation of the national audit reporting system.