TU and NTU Cooperative Game Analysis of the Macro-control Policy Coordination
Yanling Mao · Shuxue de shijian yu renshi · 2010
The coordination between macro-economic policies and the distribution of their regulation income can be seen as n-person cooperative games.By constructing 2-person TU game models of the macro policy combinations,this paper analysis the regulation intensity, income and its allocation proportion of these policy combinations.Then after building again characteristic functions of total regulation revenue in the macro policy combinations,2-person TU games are extended in succession to the cases of n-person TU games and n-person NTU games,sequentially deriving the Shapley value gives corresponding to the policy regulation profit distribution,and putting forward the specific measures to determine the regulation intensity of all policies in the macroeconomic combinations.The above studies can explain effectively macroeconomic regulation practice,and have certain directive significance.