Anticipation Capability and Signal Mode That Analysts Use to Communicate Financial Fraud: Empirical Evidences from Punishment Bulletins by CSRC
Yuan Chun · Cai-mao yanjiu · 2013
Using the sample of Chinese A-share listed companies punished by CSRC and its' matched companies in 2005- 2011,this paper examines w hether analysts can anticipate the fraud and w hat signals analysts may use to communicate financial fraud to security market. The results are:( 1) the analysts' recommendations for fraudulent companies at the end of one quarter before the first fraud behavior,and the end of quarter in first fraudulent behavior,or at the end of last quarter of fraud behavior,are more inferior to that for no- fraudulent companies;( 2) The analysts' coverage of fraudulent companies and non-fraudulent companies has no significant difference;( 3) The more analysts' coverage,the more inferior stock recommendations of fraudulent companies. The results above mean that analysts have capability of anticipate corporate financial fraud,and the efficient instrument used to signals corporate financial fraud information is not analysts' coverage but stock recommendations. The analysts' coverage number is not the result caused by analysts' self-selection in corporate fraud but the determinant of the capability of analysts' anticipate corporate financial fraud.