Events and Propositions
Roderick M. Chisholm · Noûs · 1970
1. Any theory of should be adequate to the fact of recurrence, to the fact that there are some things that recur, or happen more than once. How shall we describe the recurrence of an event? (i) We might consider saying that there are three different times such that the occurs at the earliest and at the latest and not at the one in the middle. But this will not do if we are reluctant to suppose that, in addition to there are such things as times. (ii) We might consider saying that there are three different occasions such that the occurs on the earliest and on the latest and not on the one in the middle. But what are the things we would then be calling occasions? (iii) We might say that, if an recurs, then there are q, r, and s of this sort: r occurs after q, and s occurs after r, and is exemplified or instantiated in q and in s and not in r. In this case, we would appeal to two quite different sets of entities: abstract events, or event types, such as p, which may be instantiated or exemplified in concrete events such as q, r, and s. This surely would be to multiply entities at a very early point. (iv) I suggest that, instead of positing such entities as times, occasions, or concrete events, we describe recurrence by making use of the concept of the negation of an event. We could say tenselessly that an if and only if the occurs and then after that the negation of the occurs and then after that the occurs. We must distinguish, then, between saying that a certain does not occur and saying that the negation of that does For p recurs implies p occurs and not-p occurs, but it does not imply p occurs and does not occur.