Existence Entailing Attributes, Modes of Copulation and Modes of Being in Second Order Logic
Nino B. Cocchiarella · Noûs · 1969
Recently, in [51, I formulated a second order logic of existence which centered around the distinction between those attributes ,that entail existence and those that do not.' The distinction provides an especially apt explication of the concept of existence and is for this reason especially pertinent to pragmatics and intensional logic, encompassing as they do such areas as tense, epistemic, deontic and modal logic.2 For example, apropos of tense logic some attributes, such as being red, being round, being hard, etc., cannot be possessed at a time except by objects existing at that time. Other attributes, especially relational attributes between objects whose lifespans need not overlap, such as being an ancestor of everyone (someone) now existing, being remembered by someone now existing,3 etc., may very well be possessed by objects which no longer