Ontology and General Semantics
Neil L. Wilson · Noûs · 1978
In most logic textbooks there will appear a passage somewhat along the following lines: Our L contains individual constants 'a', 'b', 'c'... , individual variables 'x', 'y', 'z',. . . and n-place predicates 'F`, 'F7,. . ..' Anatomicsentence of L consists of an n-place predicate followed by n individual expressions. ... Where does all this come from? Well, it comes from the mathematics department and although it suffices for mathematics, it won't do for any that aspires to at least some of the descriptive power of, say, English, French, and German. I shall argue that in the case of an empirical it is the world, not we, that controls the basic syntax of the language. Formation rules are not purely a matter of convention. The structure of atomic sentences must in some way mirror the structure of atomic facts. And this situation must itself be reflected in any general definition of language that we put forward.