Celllls breaks tthe Tor’’s Anonymiitty:: Oniion Routter
Ms. R.Backiyalakshmi B.E Ms. S.Sivaranjani, Ms. R.Backiyalakshmi B.E · IOSR Journal of Computer Engineering · 2014
To hide the communication of users, the anonymity systems pack the application data into equalsized cells. The size of IP packets in the Tor network can be very dynamic and the IP layer may be repack cells.A new cell-counting attack against Tor allows the attacker to confirm anonymous communication relationship among users very quickly.By varying the number of cells in the target traffic at the malicious exit onion router, the attacker can embed a secrete signal into variation of cell counter of the target traffic and it will be carried and arrive at the malicious entry onion router.Then an accomplice of the attacker will detect the signal based on received cells and confirm the communication among the users.There are several features of this attack.First, it is highly efficient and confirms very short communication session with only tens of cells.Second, this attack is effective and detection rate approaches 100% with a very low false positive rate.Third, it is possible to implement the attack in a way that appears to be very difficult for honest participants to detect.