Chisholm-Sosa Logics of Intrinsic Betterness and Value
Lennart Åqvist · Noûs · 1968
Notions of betterness (preferability, preference), goodness, badness, and of value in general can of course be studied from a variety of points of view. The logical one chosen by such authors as Hallden 1957, von Wright 1963, Chisholm and Sosa 1966, Hansson 1967, and others is obviously important. Yet, progress in this area has proved very difficult to achieve, as is witnessed by the fact that almost the only universally uncontested principles are trivial ones to the effect that the betterness-relation is irreflexive and transitive. One problem is this: if we add a binary connective P, expressing betterness, to some propositional calculus base, how does P associate with the familiar truth-functional connectives? Another question is this: can unary connectives expressing goodness, badness, indifference, neutrality, and whatnot be defined within a framework of the just-mentioned sort? And, if so, how? I suggest that failure of agreement on these issues, among others, derives from two main sources. One is the fact that the broad conceptions of betterness, and the like, which are at stake, are often not narrowed down sufficiently so as to make the questions answerable in a definite way; or perhaps it is more accurate to say that the conceptions have been narrowed down, if at all, in different directions. For instance, Chisholm and Sosa 1966 as well as von Wright 1963 emphasize that they are concerned with intrinsic betterness (preferences), Hallden 1957 emphasizes that he is not, whereas Hansson 1967 declares his perfect neutrality on the