Disabling a Computer by Exploiting Softphone Vulnerabilities: Threat and Mitigation
Ryan Farley, Xinyuan Wang · 2014
Abstract. As more and more people are using VoIP softphones in their laptop and smart phones, vulnerabilities in VoIP protocols and systems could introduce new threats to the computer that runs the VoIP soft-phone. In this paper, we investigate the security ramifications that VoIP softphones expose their host to and ways to mitigate such threats. We show that crafted SIP traffic (noisy attack) can disable a Windows XP host that runs the official Vonage VoIP softphone within several min-utes. While such a noisy attack can be effectively mitigated by threshold based filtering, we show that a stealthy attack could defeat the threshold based filtering and disable the targeted computer silently without ever ringing the targeted softphone. To mitigate the stealthy attack, we have developed a limited context aware (LCA) filtering that leverages the context and SIP protocol in-formation to ascertain the intentions of a SIP message on behalf of the client. Our experiments show that LCA filtering can effectively defeat the stealthy attack while allowing legitimate VoIP calls to go through.