Research on Differential Power Analysis Attack on RSA Algorithm
Zhiyuan Li, Haikuo Gao, Kun Rong · International Conference on Electric Information and Control Engineering · 2012
Power analysis attacks can recover the secret keys stored in cryptographic hardware devices by analyzing the input and output data combining with cross-correlation between the operation instruction and the power consumption during the cipher processing. Three methods of differential power analysis attacks against RSA algorithm are described and implemented. The first attack assumes that the smart card is willing to exponentiate an arbitrary number of random values with two exponents: the secret exponent and a public exponent. The assumption for the second attack is that the smart card will exponentiate a constant value using exponents chosen by the attacker. The last attack need internal hardware uniform exponent of the algorithm and modulus information. The practicality of three attack algorithms was confirmed by testing on the transistor level net list simulation.