What a Structuralist Theory of Properties Could Not Be
Nora Berenstain · Oxford University Press eBooks · 2015
Causal structuralism is the view that, for each natural, non-mathematical, non-Cambridge property, there is a causal profile that exhausts its individual essence. It is generally contrasted with the Humean view of properties, which states that having a property’s causal profile is neither necessary nor sufficient for being that property, and with the double-aspect view, which states that causal profile is necessary but not sufficient. Arguments in favour of causal structuralism primarily focus on problematic consequences of the other two views. In this chapter it is argued that causation does not provide an appropriate framework within which to characterize all physical properties. After distinguishing between the causal and the nomological, it is suggested that what is needed is a structuralist view of properties that is not merely causal but incorporates a physical property’s higher-order mathematical and nomological properties into its identity conditions.