Private Information Disclosure from Web Searches
Claude Castelluccia, Emiliano De Cristofaro, Daniele Perito, Inria Rhone Alpes Montbonnot · 2010
Abstract. As the amount of personal information stored at remote service providers increases, so does the danger of data theft. When connections to remote services are made in the clear and authenticated sessions are kept using HTTP cookies, data theft becomes extremely easy to achieve. In this paper, we study the architecture of the world’s largest service provider, i.e., Google. First, with the exception of a few services that can only be accessed over HTTPS (e.g., Gmail), we find that many Google services are still vulnerable to simple session hijacking. Next, we present the Historiographer, a novel attack that reconstructs the web search history of Google users, i.e., Google’s Web History, even though such a service is supposedly protected from session hijacking by a stricter access control policy. The Historiog-rapher uses a reconstruction technique inferring search history from the personalized suggestions fed by the Google search engine. We validate our technique through experiments conducted over real network traffic and discuss possible countermeasures. Our attacks are general and not only specific to Google, and highlight privacy concerns of mixed architectures using both secure and insecure connections. Update: Our report was sent to Google on February 23rd, 2010. Google is inves-tigating the problem and has decided to temporarily suspend search suggestions from Search History. Furthermore, Google Web History page is now offered over HTTPS only. Updated information about this project is available at: