ARE EVENTS ONTOLOGICALLY BASIC
Sibel KİBAR · 2009
After Einstein presented his “special theory of relativity” with its marvelous principles, “principle of relativity” and “the constant speed of light”, it led to bizarre implications, such as, time dilation, length contraction, energy-mass conversion, and invariance of the space-time interval, we had trouble to understand these stunning consequences with our very classical ontology, which can be regarded as Aristotelian ontology. Thus, both physicists and philosophers have required a new kind of ontology, capable of explaining the new phenomena. Hermann Minkovski proposed that Einstein’s theory implies a “four-dimensional space-time”, instead of a three-dimensional space with time passing over space. Accordingly, the universe consists of four-dimensional stuff such as events. Event ontology goes together with “block universe argument”. Accordingly, the universe looks like a block of ice or a loaf of bread and in which past, present and future take place together. Therefore, block universe argument makes impossible change, motion, and causal relations. Although they sound strange, “simultaneity of relativity”, an outcome of special theory of relativity, supports event ontology and block universe argument. Nevertheless, there are plenty of difficulties come along with the event ontology. In this paper, I will discuss those handicaps of the argument that events are basic components of the universe.