Quantum key distribution and cryptography: a survey
Romain Alléaume, Norbert Lütkenhaus, Renato Renner, Philippe Grangier, Thierry Debuisschert, G. Ribordy, Nicolas Gisin, Philippe Painchault, Thomas Pornin, Slavail, Louis, Michel Riguidel, Shilds, Andrew, Thomas M Langer, Momtchil Peev, Mehrdad Dianati, Anthony Leverrier, Andreas Poppe, Jan Bouda, Cyril Branciard, M. S. Godfrey · DROPS (Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz Center for Informatics) · 2010
I will try to partially answer, based on a review on recent work, the following question: Can QKD and more generally quantum information be useful to cover some practical security requirements in current (and future) IT infrastructures ? I will in particular cover the following topics - practical performances of QKD - QKD network deployment - SECOQC project - Capabilities of QKD as a cryptographic primitive - comparative advantage with other solution, in order to cover practical security requirements - Quantum information and Side-channels - QKD security assurance - Thoughts about "real" Post-Quantum Cryptography