Side Channels, Compromising Emanations and Surveillance: Current and future technologies
Richard Frankland · 2011
Side channel attacks exploit implementation-specific information leakage to defeat cryptographic measures, usually designed to provide confidentiality. The majority of published attacks require physical possession or network access to the target device, and as such are not suitable for implementation by an attacker wishing to carry out a remote, passive and undetectable attack. Surveillance techniques can be applied to compromising emanations, which is effectively side channel leakage from devices handling the sensitive, and protected, information desired by the attacker. By monitoring compromising emanations from devices processing data in plaintext, such as computer monitors and keyboards, an attacker can completely bypass the protection offered by cryptographic primitives. Published work on these emanations focusses on three main sources; electromagnetic radiation, visual representations of the data, and acoustic signals. This project aims to review the literature on techniques exploiting these emanations, and place them in the context of real world attacks, potentially undertaken by a variety of individuals and organisations. Current and future technological developments of sensors and consumer electronics will also be discussed in relation to their applicability to these attacks, identifying possible directions in which they might develop in the future.