Evaluating the Working of Blocking Misbehaving Users in Anonymous N/Ws
Lakshmi Jammulamadaka, Deepak Kumar, P. Pedda, Sadhu Naik, Samuel George · 2012
Several anonymous authentication schemes allow servers to revoke a misbehaving user’s ability to make future accesses. Traditionally, these schemes have relied on powerful, capable of deanonymizing (or linking) users’ connections. Recent schemes such as Blacklist able Anonymous Credencetials and Enhanced Privacy ID support \privacy-enhanced revocation” | servers can revoke misbehaving users without a tor involvement, and without learning the revoked users’ identities. In BLAC and EPID, however, the computation required for authentication at the server is linear in the size of the revocation list. We propose a new anonymous authentication scheme for which this bottleneck computation is independent of the size of the revocation list. Instead, the time complexity of authentication is linear in the size of a revocation window, the number of subsequent authentications before which a user’s misbehavior must be recognized if the user is to be revoked. We prove the security of our construction, and have developed a prototype implementation to validate its eminency experimentally.