Non-Invasive etmhos forostertif cation
Patrick Traynor, Michael Chien, Scott R. Weaver, Boniface HicksandPatrick McDaniel · 2006
Determining whether auser orsystem isexercising logontoanetwork, organizations suchastheNSFrequire that appropriate security practices isdifficult inanycontext. Such theyfirst beaggressively scanned formalware andsecurity difficulties areparticularly pronounced whenuncontrolled or configuration byspecialized software. Commercial software unknownplatforms joinpublic networks. Commonlypracticed techniques usedtovetthesehosts, suchassystemscans, have p i aib , thepotential toinfringe upontheprivacy ofusers. Inthis paper,(33), (30), (29). Whileeffective, thisapproach isneither weshowthatitispossible forclients toprove boththepres-desirable norscalable. WhiletheNSFmaybetrusted toscan enceandproper functioning ofsecurity infrastructure withoutlaptops, requiring suchexposure ofpersonal orproprietary allowing unrestricted access totheir system. Wedemonstrate thisdata maynotbeacceptable inmoregeneral settings. approach, specifically applied toanti-virus security, byrequiringEvolving accesspatters onlyexacerbate thechallenge clients seeking admission toanetwork topositively identify the of priv ac cessfiationly exace, thelenge presence orabsence ofmalcode ina series ofpuzzles. The ofprivacy-retaining cerification. Forexample, wireless hot- implementation ofthis mechanism anditsapplication torealspots mayrequire allhosts tobescanned forviruses prior networks arealso explored. Insodoing, wedemonstrate that it tobeingpermitted access. Theseandother procedures may isnotnecessary foranadministrator tobeinvasive todetermine legally indemnify aservice provider fromdamages resulting