Utility-based multiagent coalition formation with incomplete information and time constraints
Leen‐Kiat Soh, Costas Tsatsoulis · 2004
In this paper we propose a coalition formation model for a cooperative multiagent system in which an agent forms sub-optimal coalitions in view of incomplete information about its noisy, dynamic, and uncertain world, and its need to respond to events within time constraints. Our model has two stages: (1) when an agent detects an event in the world, it first compiles a list of coalition candidates that it thinks would be useful (coalition initialization), and (2) then negotiates with the candidates (coalition finalization). A negotiation is an exchange of information and knowledge for constraint satisfaction until both parties agree on a deal or one opts out. Each successful negotiation adds a new member to the agent's final coalition. This paper talks about the steps we have designed to enhance the finalization stage.