Amendment to: Highly Secure and Efficient Routing
Ioannis Avramopoulos, Hisashi Kobayashi, Randolph Y. Wang, Arvind Krishnamurthy · 2004
INTRODUCTION This is an addendum to paper "Highly Secure and Efficient Routing" that appears in the Proceedings of IEEE Infocom 2004 [1]. The purpose of the addendum is to amend two security vulnerabilities that we found in the protocols that are proposed therein. We would like to kindly ask the readers of "Highly Secure and Efficient Routing" to reference this addendum in addition to the published paper. In particular, we will modify Sections III.B, III.C, and V. II. REGARDING SECTION III.B OF [1] In Section III.B of [1] we state that the authentication structure, consisting of message of authentication codes (MACs), that is used for packets, should be used for ACKs and FAs as well. However, if this structure is used for ACKs and FAs, then it gives the adversary the advantage to discredit any link in the path between the source and the adversarial router. We will illustrate this with an example. Consider a path . In this path, s, n 1 , n 2 , and n