DFTT: Design for Trojan Test
Yier Jin, Nathan Kupp, Yiorgos Makris · 2010
Due to the globalization of the Integrated Circuit (IC) manufacturing industry, hardware Trojans constitute an increasingly probable threat to both commercial and military applications. As traditional testing methods fall short in finding hardware Trojans, several specialized detection methods have surfaced. To facilitate research in this area and embed internal barriers to prevent Trojan attacks both at the design level and at the manufacturing level, we propose a Design-for-Trojan-Test (DFTT) methodology. DFTT is based on one key principle: increase the complexity for hardware Trojan attackers, thereby making successful hardware Trojan-based attacks extremely difficult to accomplish. A DFTT tool is also developed to automate the hardening process. The effectiveness of our Trojan prevention method is demonstrated on the Trivium encryption core.