Comparative Bayesian Confirmation and the Quine–Duhem Problem: A Rejoinder to Strevens
Branden Fitelson, Andrew S. Waterman · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · 2007
By and large, we think (Strevens's [2005]) is a useful reply to our original critique (Fitelson and Waterman [2005]) of his article on the Quine–Duhem (QD) problem (Strevens [2001]). But, we remain unsatisfied with several aspects of his reply (and his original article). Ultimately, we do not think he properly addresses our most important worries. In this brief rejoinder, we explain our remaining worries, and we issue a revised challenge for Strevens's approach to QD. 1. Strevens's ‘clarifications’2. Strevens's new-and-improved ‘negligibility arguments’