A-theory for tense logicians
Josh Parsons · Analysis · 2003
Let us call “tense logic ” the programme of explaining tense in natural languages by means of a model theory similar in structure to possible worlds semantics for modality. This programme would make the following claims. 1) Tense is best represented formally by intensional sentential operators which should be read as “it was the case that ” and “it will be the case that”. 2) These operators should be treated similarly to modal logic’s “diamond”, or “it is possible that”, operator. In particular, they should be analysed quantificationally — something like this: “it was the case that there are dinosaurs ” is true iff there is a past time t such that “there are dinosaurs ” is true-at-t. Unmodified object-language sentences also get this kind of treatment. They are treated as implicitly present tense: “there are dinosaurs ” is true iff there is a present time t such that “there are dinosaurs ” is true-at-t. The analogy between time and modality that tense logic exploits is a controversial one. Gareth Evans (1985) has objected that it is weakest just where the tense logicians needs it to be strongest: in the analysis of truth in terms of truth-at-a-time. What I am going to do is offer the tense logician a knock-down rebuttal to any Evans-style argument. It will be up to the tense