Enforcing security for prevention of DoS attack in wireless sensor networks using economical modeling
Afrand Agah, Kalyan Basu, Sajal Kumar Das · 2005
This paper focuses on the assessment of the properties of security enforcement mechanisms for prevention of denial of service (DoS) attacks in wireless sensor networks. First part of the paper demonstrates the requirement for security enforcement using auction theory that allows detection of non cooperative nodes. In the proposed protocol, nodes prefer to participate in forwarding incoming packets and gaining reputation in the network. Nodes willing to do so must compete against each other. The competition is based on auction theory. We also formulate attack-defense problem as a non-cooperative nonzero-sum two-player game between an attacker and a wireless sensor network. This game achieves Nash equilibrium and thus leading to a defense strategy for the network. This approach is called utility based dynamic source routing (UDSR), which incorporates the total utility of each route in data packets. Results show that the proposed game frameworks significantly increase the chance of success in defense strategy for the wireless sensor network.