An Incentive Framework for Supplying Differentiate Service Based on Game Model in P2P Network
Weihan Zhang, Kun Tao, Xuejie Zhang · 2010
The existence of incentive mechanisms in Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network do not consider the actions between peers dynamically, so the compatibility of network decreases. This paper proposed a service differentiation framework based on the Game Theory to encourage all nodes to share information or services in a P2P network based on the strategies of nodes. We first introduce a game model which called equilibrium selection theory, then we model the behavior and the process of service distribution between all competing nodes. To judge the contribution of nodes, we proposed a reputation-based scheme that peers got higher reputation scores by providing more resources. Peers decide strategies using equilibrium selection game according to their reputation values. The simulation experiments illustrate that the downloading bandwidth of peers in network will modify by their contribution and the strategies between the nodes and the mechanism will take effect on avoiding whitewashing problem.