Secure Network Discovery in Wireless Sensor Networks Using Combinatorial Key Pre-distribution
Kevin J. Henry, Douglas R. Stinson · 2011
Many sensor network protocols utilize the existence of disjoint paths (e.g., perfectly secure message transmission or multi-path key establishment), but do not address how a node actually determines these paths in the presence of an adversary. In this paper we investigate what assumptions are necessary to gather information about the local network topology when adversarial nodes are present and capable of lying about their identity or neighbors in the network. These assumptions are practical, and realizable through existing tools such as combinatorial key pre-distribution, fingerprinting, and localization. Our protocols ensure that, except with small probability, if node accepts a path through the network as valid, then each node along that path must be telling the truth about its identity and nodes it can communicate with, so long as a majority of honest nodes are present in the network at each point decisions are made.