Differential distinguishing attack on the Shannon stream cipher based on fault analysis
Mehdi M. Hassanzadeh, Matthew Geoffrey Parker, Tor Helleseth, Yaser Esmaeili Salehani, Mohammad Reza Sohizadeh Abyaneh · 2008
In reference, some weak points in the design of the Shannon stream cipher and a differential distinguisher with complexity of O(214.92) keystream bits (i.e. O(29.92) keystream words) were presented. Another distinguishing attack based on a multidimensional linear transformation was presented in which require 2106.996keystream words. Both of these attacks need to have access to the initial state that is unlikely. In this paper, a likely attack using fault analysis method is exploited to solve the mentioned problem. Additionally, a new distinguisher is proposed which improves the attack complexity to four times the complexity of running the Shannon stream cipher. Only are two differential outputs needed for successful attack with error probability equal to 0.001.