Team Incentives in BitTorrent Systems
Rafit Izhak-Ratzin, Nikitas Liogkas, Rupak Majumdar · 2009
Although the popular BitTorrent protocol strives to limit free-riding via its tit-for-tat incentives, recent research efforts have shown that it does not strictly enforce fairness. Free-riding opportunities indeed exist, mainly via optimistic unchokes, a BitTorrent mechanism that facilitates the continuous discovery of better peers to interact with. Our results in this work also show that increasing numbers of free-riders can considerably hurt the performance of compliant peers. In an effort to address this problem, this paper proposes a new BitTorrent-like protocol that dynamically organizes peers of similar upload bandwidth in teams-groups of peers collaborating for mutual benefit. Team members mostly satisfy their data download needs inside their team and only perform optimistic unchokes when absolutely necessary. As a result, this team-based protocol improves peer performance via explicit cooperation. At the same time, it limits bandwidth spent on optimistic unchokes, thereby rendering the system more robust against free-riders. We have modified an existing BitTorrent implementation to implement the team protocol and have evaluated its impact by running real experiments on a controlled PlanetLab testbed. Our results show that the protocol enables slightly improved performance for compliant peers, while free-riders are unable to sustain high download rates, as compared to regular BitTorrent. In addition, we observe a higher degree of robustness: increasing numbers of free-riders in the system have a significantly lower negative impact on the performance of contributing peers.