Pretty good assurance
Jacqueline Williams, Marv Schaefer, Douglas J. Landoll · 1995
This paper describes the need for pretty good assurance: clearly stated claims about the security properties of systems, accompanied by evidence that explains in clear terms why we should believe that these claims are substantiated. Several different types of threats are identified and their relationships to assurance are explored. The developer's role in creating an assurance argument is distinguished from the user's role consuming assurance. Finally, some thoughts on the future are presented. 1. AN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY CRISIS Why Assurance? There is a crisis emerging in information technology. Reliance on this technology is increasing much more quickly than our ability to deal with the also increasing threats to information security. Users need to know if their products are susceptible to threats, but are usually oblivious to the scope and nature of the problem. Often, technology is blindly trusted, although it is neither understood nor trustworthy. What is needed is assurance....