CRT RSA Hardware Architecture with Fault and Simple Power Attack Countermeasures
Apostolos P. Fournaris, Odysseas Koufopavlou · 2012
RSA cryptographic algorithm has long achieved cryptographic and market maturity. However, RSA implementations, after the discovery of Side Channel Attacks (SCA), are susceptible to a variety of different attacks that target the hardware structure rather than the algorithm itself. There are a wide range of countermeasures that can be applied on the RSA structure in order to protect the algorithm from SCAs, however few of them are efficient in hardware since they add extensive performance cost to an SCA resistant RSA implementation. In this paper, a hardware architecture is proposed based on a Fault attack (FA) and Simple Power attack (SPA) resistant algorithm for Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) RSA that through the principles of parallelism and component reusability can guarantee hardware efficiency. We describe an implementation approach based on Montgomery modular multiplication and also propose a testing hardware architecture to simulate the security chip environment that our FA-SPA resistant CRT RSA can be integrated in. The designed architecture is implemented in FPGA technology and results on its time and space complexity are extracted and evaluated.