Rational Belief Revision (Preliminary Report)
Jon Doyle · 1994
Theories of rational belief revision recently proposed by Gärdenfors and Nebel illuminate many important is-sues but impose unnecessarily strong standards for cor-rect revisions and make strong assumptions about what information is available to guide revisions. We recon-struct these theories according to an economic standard of rationality in which preferences are used to select among alternative possible revisions. By permitting multiple partial specifications of preferences in ways closely related to preference-based nonmonotonic logics, the reconstructed theory employs information closer to that available in practice and offers more flexible ways of selecting revisions. We formally compare this notion of rational belief revision with those of Gärdenfors and Nebel, adapt results about universal default theories to prove that there is no universal method of rational belief revision, and examine formally how different limitations on rationality affect belief revision.