A Non-Interactive Dual Channel Continuous Traffic Authentication Protocol
David Irakiza, Md. Enamul Karim, Vir V. Phoha · IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security · 2014
We introduce a non-interactive dual-channel protocol for continuous traffic authentication and analyze its security properties. We realize the proposed protocol by facilitating dual channels at the keyboard with the assistance of a lightweight hardware module. The proposed protocol does not require users' explicit engagement in the authentication process. Empirical results show that, for a 30-day period, the maximum false reject rate for all legitimate requests on a day is 6% (with a 30 day daily average of 2.4%) and the false accept rate on any given day is 0%. The daily maximum false reject rate of the user requests falls to 0% if the users are forced to engage explicitly in the protocol operation for a maximum of 1.2% of users' non-typed requests.