Belief revision with unreliable observations
Craig E. Boutilier, Nir Friedman, Joseph Yehuda Halpern · 1998
Research in belief revision has been dominated by work that lies firmly within the classic AGM paradigm, characterized by a well-known set of postulates governing the behavior of “rational” revision functions. A postulate that is rarely criticized is the success postulate: the result of revising by an observed proposition'results in belief in'. This postulate, however, is often undesirable in settings where an agent’s observations may be imprecise or noisy. We propose a semantics that captures a new ontology for studying revision functions, which can handle noisy observations in a natural way while retaining the classical AGM model as a special case. We present a characterization theorem for our semantics, and describe a number of natural specialcases that allow ease of specification and reasoning with revision functions. In particular, by making the Markov assumption, we can easily specify and reason about revision. 1