Chinese Rooms and Program Portability
Mark D. Sprevak · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · 2007
I argue in this article that there is a mistake in Searle's Chinese room argument that has not received sufficient attention. The mistake stems from Searle's use of the Church–Turing thesis. Searle assumes that the Church–Turing thesis licences the assumption that the Chinese room can run any program. I argue that it does not, and that this assumption is false. A number of possible objections are considered and rejected. My conclusion is that it is consistent with Searle's argument to hold onto the claim that understanding consists in the running of a program. 1. Searle's Argument1.1. The Church–Turing thesis2. Criticism of Searle's Argument3. Objections and Replies3.1. The virtual brain machine objection3.2. The brain-based objection3.3. The syntax/physics objection3.4. The abstraction objection3.5. The ‘same conclusion’ objection3.6. The ‘unnecessary baggage’ objection3.7. The Chinese gym objection3.8. The syntax/semantics objection3.9. Turing's definition of algorithm3.9.1. Consequences3.9.2. Criticism of the defence4. Conclusion