Power invariant secure IC design methodology using reduced complementary dynamic and differential logic
Vijay Sundaresan, Srividhya Rammohan, Ranga R. Vemuri · 2007
Security of cryptographic devices (secure ICs) like smart cards has come under threat from powerful side channel attacks like Differential Power Analysis (DPA). DPA uses power consumption information leaked from the secure IC in conjunction with statistical correlation techniques to retrieve the secret key stored in the secure IC. The most effective countermeasure to resist DPA attacks is to make the power consumption of the secure IC invariant, hence uncorrelated to the input data (secret key). In hardware implementations, this can be achieved by designing the secure IC using Dynamic and Differential Logic (DDL) style. In this paper, we present a novel methodology to design DPA-resistant power invariant secure ICs using Reduced Complementary Dynamic and Differential Logic (RCDDL). The proposed methodology involves strategies to design: 1) RCDDL gates, and 2) secure circuits using RCDDL gates. Experiments show significant improvements in security strength, average power consumption and area, when compared with a similar secure DDL and non-secure static-CMOS logic design styles.