A side channel attack countermeasure using system-on-chip power profile scrambling
Armin Krieg, Johannes Grinschgl, Christian Steger, Reinhold Weiß, Josef Haid · 2011
Since the discovery that hardware used for cryptographic applications could leak secret information through its power or radiation profile a wide range of possible attack methods has been published. The rapid evolution of these side-channel attacks made it increasingly important to minimize this possible information leakage. Additionally timing information also derived from this power profile is used to control fault-attack campaigns to drive the system into an unintended state. Therefore a wide range of leakage countermeasures has been developed for dedicated cryptographic hardware. Contrariwise only little work is available concerning power profile scrambling techniques for cryptographic software implementations running on general purpose architectures. Such implementations often include power management hardware to cope with several power budget constraints which could be used to influence the system's power consumption during run-time. This paper proposes a novel side channel attack countermeasure technique using such power management methods in combination with techniques for power profile manipulation. State-of-the-art power estimation hardware using a reduced power model allows for the efficient on-line monitoring and manipulation of the power consumption and radiation profile.