An Incentive Mechanism for Peer-to-Peer Networks with Live Streaming
Daniel A. G. Manzato, Nelson L. S. da Fonseca · 2006
Although peer-to-peer networks are more scalable than client-server ones, they face efficiency challenges. One of them is the selfish behavior of non-cooperative peers. Another challenge is the short time peers stay connected to the system, which causes disruptions of the delivery of time-constrained content. This paper introduces an incentive mechanism to address both problems in peer-to-peer networks with live streaming. I. INTRODUCTION Peer-to-peer networks have been considered for the delivery of video streaming, either replacing or complementing the client-server architecture. In networks with live streaming, the content is delivered synchronously among peers, typically by using multicast distribution trees, whereas in networks with on demand streaming the content is delivered asynchronously. In the latter, it is possible that different peers serve different segments of the same streaming for a given request. However, the behavior of non-cooperative peers, who coop- erate less than consume, is a true challenge to the effectiveness of video delivery services. Previous research on peer-to-peer file sharing pointed out that at most 30% altruistic peers serve the majority of all requests (1), which is considered not