Naive Theories of Motion
Michael E. McCloskey · Psychology Press eBooks · 2014
In this chapter we describe research aimed at determining what sorts of knowledge are in fact acquired through experience with moving objects. We first present some basic findings from experiments in which subjects solved simple problems concerning objects in motion. We then show that these and other findings imply that people develop on the basis of their everyday experience remarkably well-articulated naive theories of motion. Further, we argue that the assumptions of the naive theories are quite consistent across individuals. In fact, the theories developed by different individuals are best described as different forms of the same basic theory. Although this basic theory appears to be a reasonable outcome of experience with real-world motion, it is strikingly incon sistent with the fundamental principles of classical physics. In fact, the naive theory is remarkably similar to a pre-Newtonian physical theory popular in the 14th through 16th centuries.