The nature of concepts: A point of view
Vincent C. Arnone · Theory Into Practice · 1986
On occasion, one may suddenly be called upon to define or clarify, for himself or others, a word form that has been so basic to his personal understanding and inquiry that to pause and consider the what or why of it seems redundant. If it should become necessary to respond to some probing, insistent semantic challenge (Well, define it!), the knowledgeable individual proceeds with assurance until the formidable impasse takes place. For instance, What is a concept? Now the encounter begins. That word we believed we knew so well and used so frequently becomes enmeshed in a bewildering variety of meanings given it by society, cultural institutions, professional groups and so on. This complexity of multiple meanings, informed understandings, and tacit agreements about a becomes the real identity of the word. Concept means many different things to many different people. Since definitive agreement is so difficult it becomes necessary to establish a route of inquiry through which a base of shared understandings and uses of the word may be developed. core of the problem lies in the inquiries one finds useful in dealing with the complexities of understanding. Some constructs for systemizing relations among various elements of analysis have been suggested by recent research. Structural characteristics of concepts as defined by researchers such as Berlyne (1965), Davis (1966), and Gagne (1966) suggest a range of different viewpoints, some of which overlap. Upon close examination of various theoretical systems, we see a pervasive group concept of the nature of concepts. It may be helpful to consider H. H. Kendler's comments in Melton's text (1964) on the topic, The Concept of the Concept. Kendler felt that because of the scientific infancy of this topic, he was in the inevitable, but not uncommon, position of being unconstrained by an orderly arrangement of facts and theories which would demand systematic treatment of the topic. Such freedom permits flights of fancy and broad generalizations without much fear of embarrassment by any clear-cut contradictory evidence. It is interesting to note that Kendler's investigation of the is concerned not with empirical criticism of the problem, but with clarification. He is less concerned with theoretical truth than