Taxonomical Security Consideration of OAEP Variants
Yuichi Komano · IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics Communications and Computer Sciences · 2006
We first model the variants of OAEP and SAEP by changing a construction and position of a redundancy, and establish a universal proof technique in the random oracle model, the comprehensive event dividing tree. We then make a taxonomical security consideration of the variants of OAEP and SAEP, based on the assumptions of one-wayness and partial-domain one-wayness of the encryption permutation, by applying the tree. Furthermore, we demonstrate the concrete attack procedures against all insecure schemes; we insist that the security proof failure leads to some attacks. From the security consideration, we find that one of the variants leads to a scheme without the redundancy; the scheme is not (plaintext aware) but IND-CCA2 secure. Finally, we conclude that some of them are practical in terms of security tightness and short bandwidth.