An analytic approach to cyber adversarial dynamics
Patrick Sweeney, George V. Cybenko · Proceedings of SPIE, the International Society for Optical Engineering/Proceedings of SPIE · 2012
To date, cyber security investment by both the government and commercial sectors has been largely driven by the myopic best response of players to the actions of their adversaries and their perception of the adversarial environment. However, current work in applying traditional game theory to cyber operations typically assumes that games exist with prescribed moves, strategies, and payos. This paper presents an analytic approach to characterizing the more realistic cyber adversarial metagame that we believe is being played. Examples show that understanding the dynamic metagame provides opportunities to exploit an adversary's anticipated attack strategy. A dynamic version of a graph-based attack-defend game is introduced, and a simulation shows how an optimal strategy can be selected for success in the dynamic environment.