Scan-based side-channel attack on Camellia cipher using scan signatures
Huiqian Hang, Mika Fujishiro, Hirokazu Kodera, Masao Yanagisawa, Nozomu Togawa · 2014
Camellia, a block cipher jointly developed by Mitsubishi and NTT of Japan, is suitable for both software and hardware implementations and more secure than AES cipher. One of design-for-test techniques using scan chains is called scan-path test, in which testers can observe and control registers inside the LSI chip directly. Recently, scan-based side-channel attack is reported which retrieves the secret information from the cryptosystem using scan chains. In this paper, we propose a scan-based attack method on Camellia cipher using scan signatures. Our proposed method is based on equivalent transformation of the Camellia algorithm and key pattern reduction in order to retrieve the secret key. Experimental results show that our proposed method sucessfully retrieves its 128-bit secret key using 960 plaintexts if the scan chain is only connected to the Camellia cipher and also sucessfully retrieves its key on SASEBO-GII, which is a side-channel attack standard evaluation board.